A propositional version of Feldman and Harel's PrDL (1982, "14th ACM Sym-pos. on Theory of Computing," pp. 181-195; J. Comput, System Sci. 28, No. 2 (1984), 193-215) is defined, and shown to be decidable in double-exponential space. The logic allows propositional-level formulas involving probabilistic programs, and contains the full (quantified) real-number theory for dealing with probabilities. The decidability proof introduces a succession of abstractions of the notion of a model, from the full generality of measure theoretical models, down to the finite schematic models, which seem to be the most basic structures relating programs and probabilities.
Following the recent popularity of probabilistic algorithms for solving problems which are otherwise hard or even unsolvable, some attention has been given to the formalization of correctness proof methods for probabilistic programs. Perhaps the first step in this direction is Kozen's definition of a formal semantics for such programs (Kozen, 1979) . The next step would be a formal programming logic for probabilistic programs, and several systems have indeed been proposed. On a first-order (or higher order) level are Ramshaw's frequency system (Ramshaw, 1981) , a semi-formal system based on the Floyd-Hoare inductive assertion method, and Feldman and Harel's PrDL (Feldman and Hard, 1982; Feldman, 1984) . The latter is a powerful logical system which is shown there to admit a complete axiomatization relative to the underlying program-free probabilistic language. Unfortunately, the underlying theory itself is highly undecidable (equivalent to second-order arithmetic in the discrete case). Feldman (1984) contains a detailed explanation of why we believe this to be characteristic of any logic powerful enough to express interesting firstorder properties of probabilistic programs, and the fact that no other such first-order logics have been suggested seems to corroborate this feeling. Thus it seems desirable to have a further abstraction in the form of a programming logic on the propositional level for reasoning about probabilistic programs; a major requirement from such a propositional logic is decidability of its validity problem.
Proposals for such propositional logics are Reif's (1980) PROB-DL, Makowsky and Tiomkin's (1983) PPDL, and Lehmann and Shelah's (1983) and Hart and Sharir's (1983) probabilistic temporal logics. However, in Lehmann and Shelah (1983) and Hart and Sharir (1983) programs do not appear explicitly at all, while in Reif (1980) the programming language is not natural and, in particular, contains no deterministic branching construct. In all systems probabilities appear as constants: rational numbers in Reif (1980) , 0 or 1 in Lehmann and Shelah (1983) . Makowsky and Tiomkin (1983) present an infinitary logic with a complete axiomatization; however, the logic is not decidable (or even countable), and three finitary versions of the logic are shown in Makowsky and Tiomkin (1983) be undecidable, and, moreover, not recursively axiomatizable. Kozen's (1983) contains a different approach to probabilistic programming logics, which nevertheless is quite similar in parts to this work. In expressive power (though not in general spirit) the well-structured part of his system (which is the only part shown to be decidable) is in fact subsumed by the logic presented here, as shown by Theorem 2.
In this paper we define a propositional version P-PrDL of Feldman and Harel's PrDL which preserves many of the powerful characteristics of that logic, such as the ability to use the full power of first-order real-number theory for dealing with probabilities, and deterministic regular programs as in SDPDL (Halpern and Reif, 1981) , while still being decidable. The decidability proof, which is nontrivial, introduces a succession of abstractions from the most general notion of a measure-theoretic model down to schematic models, which seem to be the most basic structures relating programs and probabilities, and ultimately reduces the validity problem to truth in first-order real-number theory, proven to be decidable by Tarski (1948) .
Section 2 of the paper defines the syntax of the language, Section 3 defines the semantics, and Section 4 contains some examples and discussion. Section 5 presents the decidability proof, and Section 6 contains a conclusion and discusses possible future work.
THE SYNTAX
The first-order version PrDL contains two types of variables: program variables range over the domain of computation, and appear in programs and events; global variables range over the domain of analysis, and are thus real-valued, since they are used to discuss probabilities.
In P-PrDL, programs and events are propositional, and therefore there is no need for program variables. P-PrDL does contain the real-valued global variables, but uses as the underlying theory the decidable real-number theory rather than the highly-undecidable first-order analysis. (The formal difference between the two is the absence of any means for identifying the integers in the former logic. See Rogers, 1967, for details.) Let q~o be the set of atomic events, which will be informally represented by p, q ..... and let/7o be the set of atomic programs, informally represented by a, b,.... The set ~b of events is the smallest set containing the atomic events as well as the events -nP and (P v Q) for any events P and Q.
We shall use a, -, D, true, and false as abbreviations in the usual way, and drop parentheses whenever convenient.
The set H of programs is the smallest set containing the atomic programs, the special program SKIP, and the programs (e; fl), (if P then c~ else fi) and (while P do e) for any programs c~ and/7 and event P. Given an event P, the program which does nothing when P is true and diverges when P is false is while -1P do SKIP. This program will be called a guard, and abbreviated to P!.
Terms in the language are composed of first-order terms from real-number theory and frequencies, corresponding to unnormalized probabilities. (This is essential for the proper handling of non-termination, since that information is lost in normalization. See Feldman and Harel, 1982; Kozen, 1979; Ramshaw, 1981 .) The set T of terms is the smallest set containing 0, 1, xi for all natural i, Fr(P) for any event P, and -s, (s + t), and (s-t) for any terms s and t.
We shall use Pr(P) as an abbreviation for Fr(P)/Fr(true) (or 0 if the denominator vanishes), which in essence normalizes the measure Fr(P) to a probability measure. More formally, we write Pr(P)= x instead of
Finally, formulas of P-PrDL are first-order combinations of terms, qualified by programs. The set O of formulas is the smallest set containing (s=t) and (s<t) for any terms s and t, and 7P, (P v Q), (3xiP) and ({~}P) for any formulas P and Q, program c¢ and natural i. The intended meaning of the construct {e}P is: "P will be true after execution of c~." Again we use A, --, D, V, true, and false as abbreviations in the usual way, and drop inessential parentheses.
At this point we wish to extend the syntax of P-PrDL somewhat, by allowing terms of the form Fr({e}P) for an event P, representing the frequency of P after execution of e in the current state. This can be translated back into "standard" P-PrDL by replacing the term with a new variable x, adding a conjunct {~} Fr(P)= x to the innermost subformula containing the term and quantifying that subformula existentially over x. Furthermore, we will understand Fr({~} {fi}P) to mean Fr({c~; fl}P), and {c~}t for a term t to mean t with all Fr(P) subterms replaced by Fr({a}P).
While this extension does not change the expressive power of the language, it simplifies the notation and brings it closer to the arithmetic approach advocated by Kozen (1983) . In fact, the truth-functional approach does not contradict the arithmetic approach but rather subsumes it, as is shown in Section 4. Note that using this notation it is always valid that ({c~} Fr(P)=x)-(Fr({a}P)=x). Examples of valid formulas are presented in Section 4.
THE SEMANTICS
The semantics of P-PrDL is a direct adaptation of that of PrDL (Feldman and Harel, 1982) for propositional events and programs.' A model for P-PrDL is a structure V assigns a real number to every variable xi.
Given a model ~ as above, the semantics is defined in the following way: First, ~ is extended to all of ~ by letting
• ~(-1P)=D-~(P), and
• z(P v Q) = z(P) ur(Q).
Clearly this conserves measurability.
Next, p is extended to all of H; this is a straightforward application of Kozen's (1979) semantics:
• p(SKIP) = IM, the identity on M;
where eB is the map taking # to #B such that/~B(A) =/~(A • B), i.e.,/~n is 0 outside of B.
• p(while P do o~) =~;'~=oe~(~p)o(p(o:) 
Applying these definitions to P! we get p(P!)= e~ (p) . This means that the program P! eliminates all mass which does not satisfy P; it changes a probability measure to the unnormalized conditional probability Pr(. [ P), decreasing the total mass to Fr(P).
It is a consequence of Kozen (1979) that p(a) is a weakly-continuous linear non-increasing mapping as defined earlier. (See also Kozen, 1983 .)
The meaning of a term t will be a function U*(t): M-, R, defined as follows:
(the above are all constant functions)
• U*(Fr(P))(bt)=/~(z(P)), i.e., Fr(P) evaluated at the state # is the measure under/~ of the meaning of P;
• U*(s + t)-U*(s) + u*(t);
• U*(s't)-U*(s)" U*(t).
Finally, the semantics of formulas are defined by specifying when a state /~ satisfies a formula P, written as all, #~P, or simply #~P when the model is understood from the context:
• /~Ns= t iff U*(s)(lO = U*(t)(#); • ¢t~s < t iff U*(s)(#) < U*(t)(~);
• /~P iff/~ ~ P;
• #~P v Q iff/z~e or/~Q;
• #~3x, P iffthere is a real number r such that J/l[x]r], #~P, i.e.,/~ satisfies P in the model resulting from replacing V(x~) by r in ~';
• #~ {~}P iff p(~)(/z)~P, i.e., {~}P is true at/~ if P is true at the state derived from # by executing the program ~.
643/63/1/2-2 Given a formula P, let pv be its universal closure, i.e., P with all free global variables universally quantified. DEFINITION 1. A formula P is said to be ./~l-valid, written J/~P, if J//l, #~pV holds for every/~ in J//; it is valid if it is J/g-valid in every model ~/~; it is satisfiable if its negation is not valid.
EXAMPLES AND DISCUSSION
The following are valid formulas:
This expresses the fact that programs cannot increase the total probabilistic mass.
({ a } Pr(q) = x) -= ( {if p then a else a } Pr(q) = x). 
The following valid schemes might be used as axioms in an axiomatic deduction system for P-PrDL; most are taken from PrDL: As examples of the extended notation of Section 2 as well as of Theorem 2 below, we translate some of Kozen's "basic properties" FKozen, 1983, Sect. 4] , for well-structured programs, into P-PrDL (note that (4), (6), and (7) are equivalent to A7, A6, and A8, respectively):
Fr ( 
Fr({while P do ~}O)= Fr(-qP A Q)+ Fr({P!; ~; while P do ~}Q); (7) Fr(--q P ^ R) + Fr({P!; ~}O) ~< Fr(Q)
The validity of this rule stems from the fact that at state p(while P do ct)(#) the meaning of Fr(R) is p((e!; ~)"; -~P!)(u)(¢(R))
(The inequality is justified by the assumption of the rule.) This last rule, translated into "standard" P-PrDL, would read
The question of whether the axioms and rules given here suffice for completeness is still open.
As was mentioned in Section 1, Kozen's (1983) presents a different approach to probabilistic programming logics. It defines an "arithmetical" system called PPDL. Although the syntax of PPDL is superficially very different form that of P-PrDL, the semantics of the two systems are equivalent, even to the point of using the same models, with two exceptions: (a) PPDL requires atomic programs to be total, whereas P-PrDL does not; and (b) initial states in PPDL, but not in P-PrDL, are assumed to have a total mass of 1. A consequence of the first difference is that, while any atomic program in P-PrDL can be consistently replaced by a compound program, preserving validity, the same is not true for PPDL.
The definition of PPDL is certainly elegant, and Kozen makes a case for working with the general (but not well-structured) a* construct. However, the main result for PPDL, namely, a polynomial-space decision procedure, is available for formulas involving well-structured programs only. The decidability part of this result (though not the complexity bound) follows from the decidability of P-PrDL, since the well-structured part of PPDL is reducible to P-PrDL. This is seen by the following theorem: Note that since satisfiability in PPDL is only definable for a model, and since PPDL does not contain probabilistic states, we must settle for Jgvalidity in the statement of the theorem.
Proof The proof will construct an analogue 0 for every element 0 of the language of PPDL. All constructions will be effective. For convenience we slightly rearrange Kozen's definitions:
Atomic measurable functions are taken as atomic events, and propositions are translated into compound events: i = true, and the operations /~ and -1 remain unchanged.
Programs (assumed to be well-structured) remain the same, except that skip = SKIP, and fail = false!.
Functions are translated into terms: a proposition P appearing as a function is translated into Fr(P); rf+sg-=rf+sg; P'f={P!}f; and (~ >f= {~}f (We are using the extended definitions of Section 2,)
Finally, a formula f ~< g is translated into f ~< ~. Since the semantics are equivalent (the two exceptions mentioned above do not apply here, the first since J¢ is a PPDL model, and the second because of the antecedent Fr(true) = 1 ), the theorem easily follows. The formal proof proceeds by showing that programs in each case represent equivalent transformations (this is done in Kozen, 1983) ; that the set whose characteristic function is the proposition P is exactly the meaning of the event _P; and that the function f in PPDL on a point d has the same value as the P-PrDL term f on a unit mass concentrated at d. |
The only change needed in the decidability proof of P-PrDL in order to make it applicable to PPDL is to force atomic programs to be total; this is done by changing the appropriate inequalities into equalities. This now provides a proof of the decidability of well-structured PPDL augmented to include real-number theory and all first-order combinations of measurablefunction terms.
The correspondence works the other way as well: P-PrDL can be made to include PPDL programs, most notably the linear combination re + sfl and generalized iteration e*, and the same translation would reduce full PPDL to the extended la-PrDL. However, nothing is currently known about the decidability of either system.
DECIDABILITY
The main part of this section is devoted to the proof of the decidability of the validity problem for P-PrDL. Sections 5.1 through 5.4 describe a decision procedure for deciding satisfiability of a P-PrDL formula. The validity of P is of course checked by testing for the non-satisfiability of -7 P. Throughout we assume that a fixed P-PrDL formula P is given, and we want to decide whether P is satisfiable.
Section 5.1 describes countable structures, called tree models, which represent all relevant parts of a model satisfying P, if one exists. Section 5.2 contains the first step towards finite representations of models, in the form of a finite description of execution sequences by signatures. This is sufficient for completing the proof for the special case where P contains a single atomic program; this is done in Section 5.3. This proof is then generalized in Section 5.4 to apply to any P-PrDL formula. Section 5.5 gives lower and upper bounds on the complexity of the decision procedure. Section 5.6 concludes by showing that the inference problem for P-PrDL is H~-hard.
Countable Representations---Tree Models
In this section the general measure-theoretic notion of a model is replaced by countable (discrete) structures. First we define a technical but useful concept: DEFINITION 3. A formula of P-PrDL is said to be in standard form if it is a first-order combination of atomic predicates and formulas of the simple form {e} Fr(true)=x, and if all frequency terms are qualified by some program.
LEMMA 4. Every formula of P-PrDL has a logically-equivalent formula in standard form.
Proof The first step is to change all occurrences of Fr to be of the simple form Fr(P)= x for a variable x. This is accomplished by introducing new existentially quantified variables; e.g., Fr(P)=Fr(Q) is replaced by 3x(Fr(P)=x ^ Fr(Q)=x). Next, all programs are "pushed" down over negations, disjunctions, and quantifiers, so that programs appear only in formulas of the form {51}''" {~k) Fr(P)=x, or equivalently, {~l;...;~k}Fr(P)=x. Finally, {~}Fr(P)=x should be replaced by {~; P!} Fr(true)= x, and all unqualified frequency terms are qualified by {SKIP}. The resulting formula is in standard form and is clearly equivalent to the original formula. (Cf. axioms A2-A5, A7, and A9.) | Since the above transformations are effective, we can assume without loss of generality that P is in standard form. Assume therefore that P is a first-order combination of the formulas (c~i} Fr(true) = xi for 1 ~< i ~< m, and denote the atomic events and programs in P by Pl,---, P~ and al,..., at, respectively. We can further assume without loss of generality that ~bo= {Pl ..... Pk} and //0 = {al ..... at}. Let 7 j be the set of all atoms over Pl,---, P,, i.e., all formulas of the form /~=1 +Pi, where _+p; is Pi or its negation. Now let B be the regular set of strings (~UH0)*~. Every string = Qi0 a jl QiF'" a j, Q j, e B represents a basic excution sequence corresponding to the program #=Qio!;ajl;Qi~!;...;ajr;Qj!. We now present a more concise description of the relevant parts of a model in terms of these basic execution sequences. DEFINITION 5. A set A_ B will be called a tree skeleton if aaQ e A implies also o-e A. A node aaQ will be called an a-son of a in the tree. (Note the similarity to the independently-defined skeletons of Kozen, 1983.) A mapping f: B --+ R + will be called a tree model if f(a)/> )ZQ~ ~,f(aaQ) for all a eB, a e//0. The tree skeleton supporting f is the set {(feB [ f(~)#0}.
A tree model represents the part of a model emanating from a given state, collecting together states which cannot be distinguished by any program starting at the given state. The values f(~r) represent the frequencies Fr({#}true). This observation is formalized in the following lemmas; the first one shows that a tree model can be "blown-up" into a full-fledged model.
LEMMA 6. To every tree model f and valuation V there correspond a discrete model X and a state v of ~/~ such that for all ~ ~ B,
Proof The measurable space for JV will be (B, 2B). Let N be the set of states of X, i.e., all finite positive measures on (B, 2s 
p(a)(#)(B) <<, #(B). The left-hand side is
#(c°). f(coaQ ) p(a)(#)(~r)= ~ p(a)(#)(o)aQ)= ~ f(co) o'eB o~eB oJ~B Qe ~ f(co)~O Q~ #(co) e~ f(o~aQ ) = ~B f(o9) f(co)v~O ~< ~ #(c°)'f(¢o)= ~ #(~o)~<#(B). f(co) e)~B o)EB f(o)) ~
. Base Case. a=Qe~P. Recall that p(Q!)=e~(e), and hence p(Q!)(v)(co) = 0, unless co e z(Q). In the latter case, p(Q!)(v)((o)= v(co), and
the result follows from the definition of v.
• Inductive
Step. (r = OaQ:
If coer(Q), the test Q! has no effect, and so 
=(~p~(Q,))(p'U('#-5)(y))(D)
(by linearity) Note that this is not true in the first-order version PrDL (Feldman and Harel, 1982) , where the formula
=( ~ e¢(Q)) (p~t(-#-d)(y))(D)=p~(a)(p~(ff)(y))(D)
is satisfiable but has no discrete model.
The following lemma introduces a number of concepts which will be needed later:
LEMMA 10. If A and B are regular sets then so are the following:
We now represent every program 7 as a regular subset R(~) of B. This is done by induction on the structure of ~:
• R(a) = ~a~P; R(SKIP) = ~;
• R(P!)=S~Q~,,Q=pQ;
.
R(while P do ~)= (R(P!)oR(~))~'oR(-qP!).
Checking that the definition of R(P!) is consistent with that of the whileloop defining it is straightforward. Proof By a straightforward induction on the structure of c~, using the linearity of p(~) and the fact that ~e~,p(Q!)=lM.
We omit the details. | Let Ri = R(~i), R = U7=1 Ri. DEFINITION 12. Two tree models f and g will be called equivalent with respect to the formula P if Z~R~f(a)= Zo~R~ g(a) for i= 1,..., m.
Intuitively, f and g are equivalent with respect to P if they cannot be distinguished by the programs appearing in P.
LEMMA 13. If f and g are equivalent with respect to P then P is satisfiable in f if and only if it is satisfiable in g.
Proof Assume that f and g are equivalent w.r.t. P and that f satisfies P with a valuation V. Let J/g and # (resp. Y and v) be the model and state derived from f (resp. g) and V. From the previous definition together with Lemma 11 and the definitions of J/g and X in the proof of Lemma 6 it follows that pJ~(~)(#) = pW(~i)(v) for all programs ~i in P. Since ~/,/t~P by the assumption, it follows that Y, v~P, which by definition implies that g satisfies P. |
Signatures
We now proceed to show that if P is satisfiable then it has a "finite" tree model with a computable structure. This is analogous to Fischer and Ladner's Small-Model Theorem for PDL (Fischer and Ladner, 1979) .
From now on we assume that P is satisfiable in the tree model f with valuation V. Our aim now is to construct an equivalent tree model g with only finitely many a for which g(a) ~ 0 (i.e., with finite support). We would like to pick a representative sequence out of every R~ and assign to it the total mass belonging to the program ~. This is impossible, however, since we also have to satisfy the condition on tree models in Definition 5, and so a deeper analysis is needed: we have to know for each sequence a which of its prefixes belong to other programs. The following lemma places a limitation on the possible interactions:
LEMMA 14. If a e R(e) then no proper prefix of a can belong to R(e).
Proof This is a direct consequence of the fact that programs are deterministic. The formal proof uses induction on the structure of e. | As a consequence of this lemma, if we label all prefixes of a with the indices of the programs they belong to, there can be no repetitions within a sequence. This motivates the following definition: Let S=2 {1 ....... t_ {~}, L = {all sequences of disjoint elements from S}. 
• Base Case. C((s))=(-l~Ri-5~i¢~Ri-ext(R). Assume atC((s)).
Then atRi for all its by condition (2); aCR~ for all iCs by condition (3); and, again by condition (3), a has no proper prefixes in R, and so a ¢ ext(R).
Assume now that a belongs to the right-hand side. We want to show that (s) is the signature of a. The first condition is trivially satisfied, and the second is satisfied since by the assumption a t R~ for all its. No longer sequence can exist, since a has no proper prefix in R, and s cannot be enlarged since ~r ¢ R~ for all i ~ s. Therefore all three conditions are satisfied and the claim is true.
Step.
Assume ~reC((sl ..... sn+1)). There must be a proper prefix e'eR of a with signature (Sl,...,Sn), and therefore ~reext (C((Sl,...,sn)) ). By condition (2), a t R i for all i t sn + 1, and by condition (3) a ~ R i for all i ~ sn + 1. The condition atext(ext (C((sl,...,s,) ))~R) would mean that there is some proper prefix a" t R of a which has a proper prefix (which must be a') in C((sl ..... sn)), contradicting the maximality of the length of (sl,...,sn+l) for a.
Assume now that ~r belongs to the right-hand side. Then a has a proper prefix a, with signature (s~ ..... sn); let a~ ..... an be the prefixes of a, specified in Definition 15, and let an+l=a. Conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied by induction for al,...,o-~ and by the assumption for an+ ~. If (Sl,..., s,+~) were not maximal for a, the fault must come after a,, since (sl,..., sn) is guaranteed to be maximal for an. The last set S,+l cannot be enlarged since a ~ R i for all i 6 S,+l. Assume that there is a (nonempty) set s' such that (s~,..., sn, s', sn+~) satisfies (at least) conditions (1) and (2). Then there must be a proper prefix a' ~ R of a which is also a proper suffix of an ; this means that a' t A = def ext(C((Sl ..... s n))) ~ R, contradicting the fact that aCext(A). Therefore condition (3) is also satisfied and ~tC ((Sl,...,sn+l) ). I
A Special Case
At this point we are ready to complete the proof for the special case where Ho contains a single atomic program a. We abstract further from the countable tree models into the finite schematic models (see Fig. 1 ).
The following definitions are special cases of the more general definitions given later. A tree skeleton will be represented by a schematic skeleton, choose some a eC(~)c~A, and close the resulting set under the prefix operation. Repeat the following steps for all chosen strings, in decreasing order of their lengths: Distribute the weight ~0(~) between the chosen aeC(~), and "filter" the weights downwards by setting f(a)= ~Q ~ ef(aaQ). The weights filtered down in this way will never exceed q~(~') for any subsequent ~' since by definition q~(~')~>Z,~o(~'. (s)). (The • operation denotes concatenation of sequences.) The excess is again arbitrarily distributed between the appropriate nodes. This clearly results in an equivalent tree model.
The schematic skeleton O representing the tree skeleton derived from the given formula P is recursive, since ~ ~ g2 if and only if C(~)~ R ¢ ~, and both sets are regular. All that is left to do is to check whether there is some schematic model on f2 which will satisfy P. This is done by constructing a formula ¢ of first-order real-number theory which is true if and only if there is such a schematic model. For each ~ E £2 create a new variable x~, and let ¢~ be A~-xe >~ w e. <s> if ~ is a non-leaf and x¢ ~> 0 otherwise. Let P' be the formula P with every subformula {c~i} Fr(true)=y replaced by ~i~las,(~) x~ = y. By the assumption on P made at the beginning of this section, P' is now a formula of first-order real-number theory. Let ¢ be the existential closure of the formula Ae~a ¢~ i P'. It is easy to check that ¢ satisfies the required condition. This concludes the proof for this special case.
Finite Representations--Schematic Models
The general proof follows along the same lines of the proof given in the previous section, but the details are more complicated due to the fact that in the presence of more than one atomic program probabilities are no longer additive at every node of the tree skeleton. In this case there are two distinct types of junctions in the tree: DEFINITION 17. Two different sequences are said to have a max-junction if their longest common prefix ends with an atom Q e 7', and a plusjunction if it ends with a program a e H0, or if it is empty.
While at plus-junctions mass maximum is taken. The intuition have a plus-junction represent is additive, at max-junctions only the behind this fact is that sequences which different cases, possibly of the same program, since they split at a test; whereas a max-junction signifies two different actions (i.e., executing two different programs) for the same case.
We need a further abstraction of tree models and tree skeletons, ignoring all intermediate states which do not belong to any program, and retaining only information about signatures and their relationships. This is a generalization of the restricted definition given earlier: DEFINITION 18. A schematic skeleton is an oriented (unordered) tree with two types of nodes, called max nodes and plus nodes, and corresponding to max-junctions and plus-junctions, respectively. A max node in the tree may be labeled with a set of indices (an element of S) with the following restrictions: an unlabeled max node must have at least two sons (of either type); a plus node can only have max nodes for sons, and must also have at least two sons. In addition, the labels on a schematic skeleton must satisfy the following three conditions:
(1) all labels on a single path must be disjoint;
(2) all labeled sons of the same plus node must have different labels; (3) the sets of indices in subtrees rooted at different sons of the same max node must be disjoint.
A schematic model is a schematic skeleton with a labeling ¢p from the nodes into the non-negative real numbers satisfying:
(1) if v is a plus node with sons ut,..., uj then ~0(v)=Z{=l ~0(ui);
(2) if v is a max nodes with sons u~ ..... uj then ~0(v) ~> max1 ~i~ q~(ui).
The limitations on the labels of schematic skeletons correspond to properties of tree skeletons: condition (1) is given by Lemma 14, and condition (3) by the following:
LEMMA 19. If O and 0 are two sequences having a max-junction and o ~ R(~) then 0 (~ R(~).
Proof This, again, is a direct consequence of the fact that programs are deterministic. The formal proof uses induction on the structure of ~. | Similarly, the restrictions on schematic models correspond to the restrictions on tree models. We now proceed to formalize the correspondence.
First, let mj(A) and pj(A) for some A ~ B be the sets of all max-junctions or plus-junctions, respectively, of strings in A. DEFINITION 20. A schematic skeleton £2 represents the tree skeleton generated by the set R if there is a mapping from Rw mj(R) onto the max nodes of £2 and from pj(R) onto the plus nodes of £2 which preserves the structure in the sense that every path in R is mapped to a path in f2 labeled by its signature, and the junction of any two strings in R is mapped to a node in the correct relative positions in the images of the two strings. Figure 2 is a graph which, when expanded to a tree, is the tree skeleton generated by the above programs; nodes which are not on any path of R are not represented. Figure 3 is the schematic skeleton representing the tree skeleton of Fig. 2. LEMMA 21. Every tree skeleton is represented by some schematic skeleton.
Proof The proof proceeds by induction on the greatest number of maxjunctions along any path in the tree (by Lemma 19 this number cannot exceed m). If there are no max-junctions at all, the schematic skeleton is simply the tree generated from the signatures of the paths in the tree skeleton, considered as sequences of labeled max nodes, by identifying common initial prefixes and adding plus nodes at every non-trivial intersection.
If the tree skeleton does have max-junctions, we know by the induction hypothesis that those parts of the tree skeleton above the first max-junction on any path have representations as schematic skeletons. The required schematic skeleton is then generated by combining those representations as subtrees of max nodes on top of the initial part of each path until the maxjunction, and combining the resulting trees as before. I
We now extend the correspondence to the weighted case. DEFINITION 22. A schematic model ~0 represents a tree model f if the schematic skeleton f2 underlying q~ represents the tree skeleton supporting f, and if Z~R,f(a)=Z~o(s), where the second sum is taken over all labeled nodes s in £2 for which i e s.
An immediate consequence of this definition is that if the schematic model q) represents two tree models f and g, these must be equivalent as tree models, and by Lemma 13, if P is satisfiable in either of them it is satisfiable in both. Therefore we can unambiguously define q) to satisfy P if any (equivalently, each) tree model represented by q~ satisfies P. (It is easy to see that there is always at least one tree model which q) represents.)
LEMMA 23. Every tree model is represented by some schematic model
Proof Given a tree model f with support A, let f2 be the schematic skeleton representing A. We define a labeling q) on (2 by assigning the weights of all strings mapped to a given node to that node. For this purpose we consider a plus-junction ~a to have weight f(cra)= Zo_~ ef(aaQ), which implies that f(a)/> maxa~nof(aa). This together with the fact that the mapping between A and (2 is structure-preserving and onto now implies that ~0 is indeed a schematic model. To illustrate this, assume that v is a max node with sons u, w; assume further that max-junctions 0i are mapped to v, each with descendants ai and z; mapped to u and w, respectively. In that case q~ q~(w) ). Since the mapping takes any node to its signature, it is clear that ~0 represents f I LEMMA 24. If a schematic skeleton £2 represents a tree skeleton A then any schematic model on £2 represents some tree model with support included inA.
Proof Assume that ~o is some schematic model on £2. We wish to define a tree model f on A which will be represented by q~. The construction of f will also define values for plus-junctions aa in such a way that f(ae)= Ze~ ~f(aaQ) and f(a)~maxa~uof(aa), which immediately implies that f(a) >~ maxa~n0 Zo~ ~,f(aaQ), as needed. The following steps are repeated for all nodes v in £2 in postorder, i.e., from the leaves to the root (cf. Knuth, 1968, p. 334) . At this point, some strings of d mapped to v by the correspondence between d and £2 may already have been given a value, but the sum of all those values is not greater than ~0(v). Divide the remaining mass q~(v) arbitrarily among the strings mapped to v. "Filter" the mass downward in f by setting f(aa)~-~,o~f(aaQ) and f(a)~-maxa~nof(aa), again in postorder, until reaching a string in A c~R or a junction of strings from that set. The process continues in this way until reaching the root. The reason we could claim at each stage that the total mass allocated to f(co) for co mapped to v does not exceed ~0(v) is that the mass filtered down is the least possible and so is equal to ~2 ~o(ui) or max ~o(ui) for the sons ui of v depending on whether v is a plus or max node, respectively. The conditions on (p ensure that ~o(v) is not less than the above amount. As in the previous lemma, it is clear that ~0 represents f I Summing up our results so far, we find that satisfiability of P is equivalent (by Lemma 8) to satisfiability in tree models. This, in turn, is equivalent (by Lemma 24) to satisfiability in some schematic model that is supported by the schematic skeleton representing the tree skeleton generated by cq,...,em. (See Fig. 1 .) It remains to be shown that this schematic skeleton can be computed effectively from the programs cq,..., c~ m. This is done by building for each program c~ a (deterministic) finite automaton A i accepting the basic execution sequences belonging to Ri. Next, the (deterministic) product automaton is built in the standard way, and each state (q~,..., qn) is labeled with the indices i for which qi is an accepting state of Az. No essential state of this automaton can have outgoing edges labeled 'both with programs and with atoms (tests), since otherwise it might accept strings which are not in B= (gtHo)* ~. (An essential state is one reachable from the initial state and from which a path 643/63/1/2-3 exists to an accepting state.) Therefore each state can unambiguously be defined to be a max node or a plus node.
The product automaton is then expanded into a tree with back edges. In this tree no state which has a non-empty label can be on any cycle, since that would contradict Lemma 14. Therefore all back edges can be deleted, and the resulting tree contracted into a schematic skeleton by deleting irrelevant states and repeatedly combining any siblings with isomorphic subtrees. (Note that this provides an alternative proof for Lemma 21.)
Having found the schematic skeleton representing the programs in the formula, we have to see if it can be made into a schematic model satisfying P. This is done by building a sentence of first-order real-number theory which is true if and only if such a schematic model can be constructed, and by Tarski's (1948) classic result, the truth of this sentence can be effectively checked.
LEMMA 25. Given a schematic skeleton £2 representing the programs in P, it is possible to construct a sentence ~ of first-order real-number theory which is true if and only if there is some assignment of weights to £2 which will make it into a schematic model satisfying P.
Proof Create a new (real-valued) variable xv for every node v eO. (Recall that £2 is finite.) Define a formula ~v according to the type of v:
• if v is a plus node with sons ul,..., uj, let Ov be xv = Y,{= 1 xui;
• if v is a max node with sons u~,..., uj, let ~b~ be A J= 1 x~ >~ x,;
• if v is a leaf, let O~bexv>~0.
Let P' be the formula P with every subformula {c~i} Fr(true) = y replaced by Zi~vx~=y, and let ~ be the existential closure of the formula /~e ~ A P'. It is now easy to check that ~ satisfies the condition of the lemma. |
We have now completed the proof of the main result:
THEOREM 26 (Decidability of P-PrDL). The satisfiability (and hence validity) problem for P-PrDL is decidable.
Complexity
An immediate lower bound on the complexity of the decision procedure for P-PrDL is the exponential-space lower bound for first-order real-number theory (Ben-Or, Kozen, and Reif, 1984) , which is a sublanguage of P-PrDL. The decision procedure described above requires, in the worst case, triple-exponential space, since the product automaton might have exponential size, 1 and the tree generated from it might add another exponential; thus the formula ~ constructed in Lemma 25 above might have double-exponential size, and yet another exponential is required by the decision procedure of (Ben-Or et al., 1984) to check whether ~p is true or not. However, this upper bound can be improved to a double-exponential-space bound, by replacing ~ by a single-exponential-size formula 0'. THEOREM 27. The validity problem for P-PrDL is decidable in doubleexponential space.
Proof. First, we must examine in more detail the procedure for transforming the product automaton into a tree with back edges. A depth-first search (DFS) is first performed on the automaton, starting with the initial state. This results in the original states of the automaton re-arranged to form a tree with back edges, forward edges ("fronds"), and cross edges (see Aho, Hopcroft, and Ullman, 1974, pp. 187-189) . The branches of this tree can be ordered in such a way that all cross edges point in the same direction. The root of the tree is the initial state. Cross edges are then eliminated, by making a new copy of the subtree they point to, thus making them into tree edges. (It is always possible to find a cross edge pointing to a tree without further cross edges, by the above-mentioned property.) Finally, fronds are similarly eliminated, and the result is a tree with back edges only.
From the above description it is clear that only back edges in the DFS graph are transformed into back edges in the final tree, and that they account for all such back edges. Since we have seen that back edges in the resulting tree can be deleted, the same must be true for the DFS graph, which now becomes a directed acyclic graph (DAG). In order to use this DAG as the skeleton for a model, it must be further refined. Each node should be subdivided into subnodes, one for each incoming edge. The weight assigned to a node should exactly equal the sum of the weights of its subnodes, and should be equal to the sum or greater than or equal to the maximum of the weights of the subnodes it points to, depending on whether it is a plus node or a max node, respectively.
We now claim that such an assignment of non-negative weights to the DAG is possible if and only if there is a corresponding assignment to the expanded tree. First, assume that there is a proper assignment of weights to the DAG. The process of eliminating non-tree edges can be carried out as before; when a subtree is copied, the weights should be distributed in proportion to the weight of the subnode pointed to by the edge causing the split, relative to the total weight of the other subnodes. This clearly conserves any plus of max conditions, and therefore creates a tree with a proper assignment of weights.
Assume now that a tree with a weighting function f is given. Every node in the tree can be unambiguously mapped to a DAG subnode, since the (single) edge from its parent to it has a unique corresponding edge in the DAG. The mapping also preserves the type of nodes (plus or max). It is now possible to define for every DAG node u a weight qo(u) to be the sum of f(v) for all tree nodes v mapped to u. To see that this assignment is proper, observe that any tree node v (~) mapped to a DAG node u has exactly one son vJ. i/in each DAG subnode uj pointed to by an edge from u, and these v~0's are the only tree nodes mapped to uj. Since in the tree we have f(v (i)) = Y~jf(v~/)) for plus nodes and f(v ~i)) >~maxjf(v} i)) for max nodes, it follows that
if u is a plus node, and
if u is a max node. Having established the fact that the formula P is satisfiable if and only if it is satisfied by an assignment to the subnodes of the DAG, we can proceed to build the formula 0' describing this assignment. Create a new variable xu for every DAG node or subnode u. For every node u consisting of subnodes ul,...,ut, let i/s, be the formula xu=Yl=lx,,. If u has sons vl,..., vj (these are subnodes), let 0', be the formula xu = y'x.= 1 xv, if u is a plus node, and/~x= 1 xu >~ x~, if u is a max node. If u is a leaf, define ~s', to be simply x, ~> 0. The required formula 0' is now the existential closure of the formula/~,(~, A ~S',) /x P', where P' is defined as in Lemma 25 above.
The DAG has as many subnodes as edges, and this number is exponential in the size of P. The formula ip' therefore has a (single) exponential size, and only double-exponential space is needed in order to determine its truth. This establishes the double-exponential-space upper bound on the complexity of the decision procedure for P-PrDL. |
The Inference Problem
We close the technical part of this paper with a negative result: THEOREM 28. The inference problem for P-PrDL is H]-hard. Proof Inference problems come in two flavors: (1) F~P if and only if JCL-validity of the formulas in F implies J//-validity of P for every model J/g; and (2) F~P if and only if the truth of all formulas of F in any state/~ implies the truth of P in ¢. We deal with the first case, and indicate the modifications necessary for the second.
We show that a certain recurring domino problem (see Harel, 1984 ) is reducible to the non-inference problem of P-PrDL. The problem is:
Given a set T of dominoes; can T tile the positive quadrant G + so that domino do occurs in the tiling infinitely often in the first column?
This is problem R2 of Harel (1984) and is shown there to be Zl-complete. Adopting the terminology of Harel (1984) , we assume an input set T= {do,..., din} involving colors C= {Co,..., ck-1} where without loss of generality k is a power of 2. Let Ho= {a, b}, and qs0= {det, fin, righti, lefti, ups, down/I 1 ~<i~<logk}. We use the meta-variable "dir" ro range over {right, left, up, down}; "Dir" will be the corresponding name with a capital. The notation [i]j will stand for the jth bit of the number i. The indices of the colors on domino d~ will be right(d~), left(d~), etc.
We define the event 
and let P be the formula Det= {while fin do b} Fr(true) = 1.
We now claim that F~ P if and only if there is no recurrent tiling of the kind described in (9). Assume first that there is no solution to (9), and assume that a model JOg satisfies F and that a state # of J¢ satisfies Det. By (11) we know that (aibJ)(#)~Det for all i, j. This ensures that at each of these states there is a unique l for which Fr(Dt) = 1. By (10) these states encode a grid, and so we can define a tiling by putting at square (i, j) of the grid the domino dt for which #~ {aib j} Fr(DI) = 1. Formulas (12) ensure that this is indeed a proper tiling. Formula (13) now implies that Fr(fin)= 1 is satisfied by a state of the grid if and only if do appears somewhere above it, since otherwise the while loop will never terminate. However, by the assumption do appears only a finite number of times in the first column, and so there must be a state in that column where Fr(fin)= 0. This implies that the while loop in P will eventually terminate, and therefore #~P, as required.
Assume now that F~P, and assume we are given a tiling of G + by T. It is easy to build a tree model satisfying F and representing the given tiling. By reasoning similar to the previous case we can show that in this tiling do appears only a finite number of times in the first column.
The only modification needed for the second type of inference problems is to prefix all formulas in F by all combinations of {aibJ}, thus forcing them to the true at all states reachable from/~ by a and b. |
CONCLUSION
We have presented a propositional logic for probabilistic programs, which is a decidable abstraction from the very powerful but highly undecidable PrDL of Feldman and Harel (1982), Feldman (1984) . This enables studying some essential attributes of probabilistic programs in isolation from the more complicated issues of first-order programs. It still has direct applicability to the general case, since by fixing the meanings of some predicates and programs to be the atomic formulas and programs of P-PrDL, every model of PrDL defines a model of P-PrDL. The decision procedure presented establishes a double-exponential-space upper-bound on the complexity of validity in P-PrDL.
In Feldman (1984) , several logics with expressive power between that of PrDL and P-PrDL are investigated; all are seen to be undecidable or otherwise inadequate. Thus, it seems that P-PrDL is the strongest decidable version of PrDL possible. Note that although P-PrDL was developed as a restriction of PrDL, 2 by a simple extension of notation it becomes very much like a probabilistic PDL, such as Kozen's (1983) PPDL.
The decidability proof for P-PrDL introduced a succession of refinements of the notion of a general measure-theoretical model, through tree models, down to schematic models, which we feel are an important concise description of a propositional probabilistic model. This feeling is reinforced by the independent use of tree models (and their supporting tree skeletons) in Kozen (1983) .
This work poses some interesting questions. First, we can ask whether there is a simple axiomatization of P-PrDL. Next, we may look for tighter bounds on the complexity of the decision precedure for P-PrDL. Finally we comment that our proof is highly dependent on the fact that programs are regular, and we can ask what is the case with other classes of programs, in analogy with the work of Harel, Pnueli, and Stavi (1983) and Harel and Paterson (1984) for PDL.
